Arrovian juntas by Eisermann, Michael
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Arrovian juntas
Michael Eisermann
August 2006
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81/
MPRA Paper No. 81, posted 3 October 2006
Preprint version available at http://www-fourier.ujf-grenoble.fr/˜eiserm
ARROVIAN JUNTAS
MICHAEL EISERMANN
ABSTRACT. This article explicitly constructs and classifies all arrovian voting systems on
three or more alternatives. If we demand orderings to be complete, we have, of course,
Arrow’s classical dictator theorem, and a closer look reveals the classification of all such
voting systems as dictatorial hierarchies. If we leave the traditional realm of complete or-
derings, the picture changes. Here we consider the more general setting where alternatives
may be incomparable, that is, we allow orderings that are reflexive and transitive but not
necessarily complete. Instead of a dictator we exhibit a junta whose internal hierarchy
or coalition structure can be surprisingly rich. We give an explicit description of all such
voting systems, generalizing and unifying various previous results.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF RESULTS
1.1. Motivation and background. Classifying the objects of an axiomatic theory is a
natural endeavour whenever it promises to be feasible and meaningful. In the case of
arrovian voting systems, it seems that this approach has remained implicit and has not
been systematically investigated in the published literature. This absence is all the more
surprising as the arrovian axioms were the first to be considered, and characterizations have
long been accomplished for several other classes of voting rules, such as simple majority
rule [9] or scoring rules [12, 14].
Ideally, a classification comprises two goals: firstly, establish a precise description and
compile an exhaustive list of all solutions satisfying the requirements, and secondly, elim-
inate possible redundancy by identifying duplicate descriptions of the same solution.
For complete orderings of at least three alternatives, the theorem of K.J. Arrow [3] says
that every voting system satisfying the axioms of unrestricted domain, unanimity, and in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives is dictatorial. As stated, this result does not yet deter-
mine the voting system: if the dictator is indifferent, then all outcomes are still possible.
Nonetheless, the dictator theorem can be used to classify arrovian voting systems: by a
careful induction argument one can exhibit a dictatorial hierarchy, as stated in Theorem 7.
1.2. From linear to partial orderings. Arrow’s classical result makes essential use of
the hypothesis that orderings be complete (also called linear or total). While reflexivity
and transitivity seem indispensable for social orderings, the requirement of completeness
is certainly less fundamental. Driven by Arrow’s negative result, it seems worthwhile to
drop completeness and to consider the more general setting of partial orderings (also called
quasi-orderings). As we will see, this framework allows for much more flexibility, and in
particular Arrow’s dictator theorem is no longer valid. It is thus natural to explore the limits
and to boldly ask: what exactly are the possibilities?
As J.A.Weymark [13] pointed out, “there has been surprisingly little work done explic-
itly on social quasi-orderings”. He went on to establish an arrovian result by proving the
existence of an oligarchy, i.e. a unique minimal decisive set of voters. He did not discuss
explicit examples, nor did he strive for a classification of possible voting systems.
In this article we consider the general setting of partial orderings and analyze it as
thoroughly as possible. We explicitly construct and classify all arrovian voting systems on
three or more alternatives: we exhibit a junta1 and precisely describe its internal hierarchy
or coalition structure. To this end we reconsider the notion of (strongly) decisive sets,
which allows us to classify the simple case (Theorem 1). We then introduce the refined
notion of relatively decisive sets, which allows us to analyze and reconstruct the inner
workings of every arrovian voting system (Theorem 2).
1.3. Relatively decisive sets. Wewill use fairly standard notation, as recalled in §2 below.
Throughout this article, I is the set of individuals (voters), and 2I denotes the collection of
its subsets. Up to §4 we will tacitly assume I to be finite of size n, say I = {1,2, . . . ,n}, but
almost all arguments are valid for infinite sets as well. We will make this explicit in §5.
We denote by A the set of alternatives, and we will always assume that A contains at
least three elements. The set of all partial preorders on A is denoted by PA. A voting
system is a map C : P IA →PA. We will exclusively be interested in the arrovian case,
whereC satisfies the axioms of unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
1 As an aside, in English and many other languages, the word “junta” usually has the connotation of military
junta, whereas in Spanish the noun “junta” can mean a formal assembly in a very general sense. This spectrum
of interpretations corresponds well to the large variety of possible models that we will see later on.
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In order to adapt the arrovian approach to partial orderings, we first revisit the notion of
(strongly) decisive subsets of I and establish the following result:
Theorem 1. Suppose that the set A contains three or more alternatives and consider a
voting system C : P IA →PA that satisfies the axioms of unanimity and independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Then C also satisfies neutrality and monotonicity.
Furthermore, there exist unique subsets K ⊆ J ⊆ I such that
(1) aK b implies a< b, and K is minimal with respect to this property.
Moreover, each k ∈ K has veto power: if a 6<k b then a 6< b.
(2) a<J b implies a< b, and J is minimal with respect to this property.
Moreover, each j ∈ J has influence: if a<J b and a j b, then a b.
In other words, K is the minimal decisive set, and J is the minimal strongly decisive set.
Any pair (K,J) of subsets /0 6= K ⊆ J ⊆ I can be realized in this way, and the trivial case
K = J = /0 corresponds to the trivial voting system C(P1, . . . ,Pn) = A×A. The case K = J
corresponds to the voting system C(P1, . . . ,Pn) =
⋂
j∈J Pj, known as Pareto rule.
Knowing the decisive sets does in general not characterize the voting system, because
the case K 6= J needs further investigation. In order to obtain complete information, we
introduce and analyze relatively decisive sets: given a subset N ⊆ I we say that J ⊆ IrN
is decisive relative to N if a ≈N b and a J b together imply a < b, independently of all
other preferences in the profile. Analogously, J is strongly decisive relative to N if already
a≈N b and a<J b imply a< b. (For N = /0 we recover the absolute notions.)
1.4. The classification theorem. We prove that for each N there exists a smallest subset
δN ⊆ IrN that is decisive relative to N. For ease of notation we also use the notation
∆N = δN unionsqN, which is equivalent to the initial data via δN = ∆NrN. (We denote by
X unionsqY the union of two disjoint sets, that is, X unionsqY = X ∪Y with X ∩Y = /0.)
By definition, δ and ∆ encode what could be called the coalition structure underlying
the voting systemC. This data is then shown to characterize every arrovian voting system,
and we construct several examples in order to illustrate the possibilities.
Theorem 2. Given an arrovian voting systemC : P IA→PA on three or more alternatives,
there exists a map δ : 2I → 2I such that δN is the minimal decisive set relative to N.
Moreover, ∆ : 2I → 2I , ∆N = δNunionsqN is the unique map enjoying the following properties:
(1) N ⊆ ∆N and ∆M ⊆ ∆N for all M ⊆ N ⊆ I. (Monotonicity)
(2) If ∆N∩M = /0 for some N,M ⊆ I, then ∆(NunionsqM) = ∆NunionsqM. (Minimality)
(3) We have a< b if and only if a≈N b and aδN b for some N ⊆ I. (Decisiveness)
Conversely, given an arbitrary map ∆ : 2I → 2I satisfying (1), we set δN = ∆N rN
and define a map C∆ : P IA →PA by the rule (3). The resulting voting system C∆ satisfies
the arrovian axioms of unanimity, neutrality, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant
alternatives. Condition (2) ensures that δN is the minimal decisive set relative to N.
An analogous version holds for infinite societies but its statement is necessarily more
involved, see Remark 56 or more generally Theorem 67 at the end of this article.
The previous theorem establishes a bijective correspondence: every arrovian voting
system C : P IA →PA is characterized by the associated coalition structure ∆ : 2I → 2I .
Even though conditions (1) and (2) may look technical at first sight, they are easy enough
to verify for any given map ∆, and lend themselves well to the construction of examples:
Example 3. We consider a set I = {1,2,3} of three voters and choose ∆ /0 = {1,2} as the
smallest decisive subset. Then we necessarily have ∆{3}= {1,2,3}, and we also know that
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∆{1} and ∆{2} must each contain {1,2}. We choose ∆{1}= {1,2,3} and ∆{2}= {1,2}.
This fixes all remaining choices to ∆N = {1,2,3}. The resulting coalition structure is
graphically represented in Figure 1.
1 2 3 32 1
N N
3 1 21 2 3
decisive decisive rel N
strongly decisive strongly decisive rel N
(absolute case)
N=Ø N is neutral
(relative case)
N
1 2 3
N
1 3 2
N
2 3 1 1 2 3
N=I (trivial case)
FIGURE 1. A possible coalition structure for three voters
In words, the associated voting systemC∆ works as follows. Given alternatives a,b∈ A,
voters 1 and 2 together can decide either a  b or a ≺ b if both agree. If 2 is indifferent,
then 1 alone can decide either a b or a≺ b. If 1 is indifferent, however, then the decision
is not left to 2 alone, but to 2 and 3: they can decide a < b or a 4 b if both agree. In all
other cases the conclusion is a⊥ b, that is, a and b are considered incomparable.
Notice that in this example each voter can influence the outcome: we have a≈ b if and
only if all three voters are indifferent (axiom of strong unanimity).
Remark 4. The apparent complexity is not an artefact of our proof but faithfully reflects
the large variety of arrovian voting systems. A certain complexity is thus unavoidable:
the map ∆ encodes the coalition structure, and, as in game theory or political practice,
coalitions are in general a complicated matter. Even in small examples such as the previous
one, the verbal description can become quite cumbersome, and the formal description using
the characteristic map ∆ is usually preferable.
1.5. Back to linear orderings. One can weaken the hypotheses by requiring the voting
systemC to be defined only on the set of linear orderings. All of our arguments apply with
only minor changes, and we obtain the following result:
Corollary 5. Suppose that A contains three or more alternatives, and letLA ⊂PA be the
set of linear orderings on A, that is, complete reflexive and transitive relations. For every
voting system C : L IA →PA satisfying the axioms of unanimity and independence of irrel-
evant alternatives, there exists a unique map ∆ : 2I → 2I satisfying the above conditions
such that C =C∆|L IA.
The previous corollary can be reformulated more succinctly, without explicit reference
to the coalition structure ∆, as follows:
Corollary 6 (Unique arrovian extension). Every arrovian voting system C : L IA →PA
admits one and only one arrovian extension C˜ : P IA →PA such that C = C˜|L IA.
This result is rather unexpected. Once discovered, it is possible, but not quite obvious,
to prove it directly, that is, without appealing to the classification. It says that we do not
gain nor lose any generality in choosing the domainL IA instead ofP
I
A.
2
2We mention in passing that Weymark [13] exclusively considered the case of voting systemsC : L IA →PA
where individual preferences are complete while the aggregate preference is allowed to be incomplete, the main
advantage being simpler proofs. With hindsight, Corollary 6 remedies this asymmetry.
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The characterization of arrovian voting systems takes a particularly nice and succinct
form if we also restrict the range to linear orderings:
Theorem 7 (Refined version of Arrow’s dictator theorem). Suppose that A contains three
or more alternatives. Then every map C : L IA → LA that satisfies unanimity and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives is a lexicographic voting rule according to a unique
sequence (k1, . . . ,k`) of ` ≥ 0 individuals in I: given any two alternatives, k1 decides on
the outcome; in case of indifference k2 decides; in case of indifference k3 decides, etc.
Conversely, each sequence (k1, . . . ,k`) defines an arrovian voting systemC : L IA →LA.
If we demand that C satisfy the axiom of strong unanimity, then the sequence is necessarily
of length ` = n. There are thus exactly n! voting systems satisfying strong unanimity and
independence of irrelevant alternatives, each corresponding to a permutation of the set I.
We obtain this result here as a corollary of the general classification, but it can also be
derived by iterated application of Arrow’s classical dictator theorem. Its generalization to
infinite societies is stated in Theorem 59, towards the end of this article.
1.6. How this article is organized. Section 2 recalls the relevant definitions and notation,
in particular concerning orderings (§2.1) and arrovian voting systems (§2.2). Section 3
reconsiders the notions of decisive and strongly decisive sets (§3.1) and establishes their
fundamental properties (§3.2). This leads to the characterization of juntas without internal
structure (§3.3). In order to treat the general case, Section 4 develops the refined notion
of relatively decisive sets (§4.1) and discusses lexicographic voting rules as a principal
example (§4.2). These tools allow us to formulate and prove the general classification of
arrovian juntas (§4.3) and its application to the case of linear orderings (§4.4). Section 5,
finally, generalizes these results to infinite societies.
2. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
Our first task is to set the stage so that the classification can unfold as smoothly as
possible. While the general axiomatic approach is standard, considerable care must be
taken to adjust (and motivate) certain details of our definitions. For this reason, and to
make this article self-contained, we will develop our arguments from scratch.
2.1. Orderings. In the sequel, A will denote the set of alternatives (decisions, proposals,
candidates, policies, allocations, issues, etc.) and preferences will be modelled by order-
ings on A. More precisely, a partial preorder on A is a binary relation P ⊆ A×A that is
reflexive and transitive, i.e. it enjoys the following two properties:
Reflexivity: We have (a,a) ∈ P for all a ∈ A.
Transitivity: Whenever (a,b) ∈ P and (b,c) ∈ P then (a,c) ∈ P.
Throughout this article we will use the term ordering as synonymous with partial preorder.
We will interpret (a,b) ∈ P as expressing that alternative a is at least as preferable as al-
ternative b. Notice that indifference is allowed, that is, (a,b) ∈ P and (b,a) ∈ P can hold
simultaneously for two distinct alternatives a,b ∈ A. Moreover, a and b can be incompara-
ble, that is, neither (a,b) ∈ P nor (b,a) ∈ P holds.
Notation. The set of all orderings P ⊆ A×A, i.e. partial preorders on A, will be denoted
by PA. We usually write a < b to denote (a,b) ∈ P. Indifference (a < b and b < a) is
denoted a ≈ b. Strict preference (a < b but not b < a) is denoted a  b. We write a 6< b
if (a,b) /∈ P. This includes incomparability (neither a < b nor b < a), denoted a ⊥ b. In
summary, we always have a ≈ a, and two distinct alternatives a 6= b are in exactly one of
the four relations a b or b a or a≈ b or a⊥ b.
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Remark 8. Indifference and incomparability are very different concepts. Notice in partic-
ular that indifference is an equivalence relation (i.e. reflexive, symmetric, and transitive),
whereas incomparability is never reflexive and in general not transitive.
Incomparability (a ⊥ b) is to be interpreted as saying that the comparison between a
and b remains undecided on the grounds of the available information. Indifference (a≈ b),
however, expresses the conviction that a and b are equally preferable. Thus, whenever a
voting system cannot reach a conclusion between alternatives a and b, it seems reasonable
to declare them incomparable, rather than equivalent.
Mathematically speaking, partial preorders are a convenient setting because they allow
for sufficient flexibility. Admittedly, it is a very general concept and may seem remote
from realistic applications. But then again it nicely models human judgements, where
indifference and undecidedness seem to enter quite naturally.
Remark 9. Most authors tend to impose stronger conditions by excluding non-comparability,
or indifference, or both. In such contexts an ordering < may be required to satisfy:
Completeness: Incomparability is excluded: a< b or b< a for all a,b ∈ A.
Antisymmetry: Indifference is excluded: a< b and b< a implies a= b.
A complete preorder (as opposed to partial) is also called linear or total: all alternatives
are ranked in a linear fashion, possibly with ties. We denote byLA ⊂PA the set of linear
orderings. An order or strict ordering is required to be antisymmetric, and a linear order
is required to be complete and antisymmetric. This last notion is the most restrictive one:
it amounts to a strict ranking of all alternatives, without ties, i.e. a1  a2  . . . am in the
case of a finite set A of m alternatives.
Remark 10. Some authors, partly on the basis of empirical psychological evidence, are
even willing to sacrifice transitivity, but we will not do so here. Transitivity is the funda-
mental constraint in this whole business and should not be given up. All of our arguments
will entirely rely on transitivity, and all constructions will carefully preserve this property.
2.2. Arrovian voting systems. LetPA be the set of all partial preorders on A, and let I
be the set of individuals (voters, agents, committee members). We will usually assume that
I is finite of size n. The cases n = 0 and n = 1 are trivial but shall not be excluded. The
subtleties of infinite societies will be discussed in §5.
An n-tuple (P1, . . . ,Pn) ∈P IA is called a preference profile. The rank aggregation prob-
lem is to single out suitable functions C : P IA ⊇ D →PA, where the domain D is some
subset of preference profiles, usually D =P IA or D =L
I
A.
In voting theory, C is called a voting system or voting rule or social welfare function: it
associates to every profile (P1, . . . ,Pn)∈D of individual preferences P1, . . . ,Pn an aggregate
preference P=C(P1, . . . ,Pn). We refer to A. Sen [11] as a general reference.
Notation. It will be convenient to write a< b instead of (a,b)∈ P, and analogously a<i b
as shorthand for (a,b) ∈ Pi. The analogous notation a b, a≈ b, a⊥ b, and ai b, a≈i b,
a⊥i b with i ∈ I will also be used. Given a subset J ⊆ I, we define a<J b to signify a< j b
for all j ∈ J, and analogously aJ b to mean a j b for all j ∈ J, etc.
In the sequel we will consider voting systemsC : P IA→PA, which is sometimes called
the axiom of unrestricted domain, because D =P IA. Each such map also satisfies what
is called the axiom of transitivity, because the range is contained in the set of transitive
relations. Among the many desirable properties of such voting systems, the following
axioms have been considered as among the most fundamental:
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Unanimity: If all individuals prefer a to b then so does the aggregate ordering.
Unanimity: a<I b implies a< b, i.e. if a<i b for all i ∈ I, then a< b.
Strict unanimity: a<I b implies a< b, and aI b implies a b.
Strong unanimity: a<I b implies a< b. Moreover, if a<I b and ai b for some
i ∈ I, then a b. (Obviously strong unanimity implies strict unanimity.)
Monotonicity: If in each individual preference the comparison between a and b
changes in favour of a or remains unchanged, then the same holds true for the ag-
gregate preference. Formally, consider P =C(P1, . . . ,Pn) and P′ =C(P′1, . . . ,P
′
n):
if {i | a <i b} ⊆ {i | a <′i b} and {i | b <i a} ⊇ {i | b <′i a}, then a < b implies
a<′ b.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): The aggregate ranking between a
and b depends only on their individual pairwise rankings. Formally, consider
P = C(P1, . . . ,Pn) and P′ = C(P′1, . . . ,P
′
n): if {i | a <i b} = {i | a <′i b} and {i |
b<i a}= {i | b<′i a}, then a< b if and only if a<′ b. (This is a consequence of
monotonicity.)
Neutrality: All alternatives are treated symmetrically, i.e. we haveC(ρ∗P1, . . . ,ρ∗Pn)=
ρ∗C(P1, . . . ,Pn) for all P1, . . . ,Pn ∈PA and every permutation ρ : A→ A.
Anonymity: All individuals are treated symmetrically, i.e. we haveC(Pσ1, . . . ,Pσn)=
C(P1, . . . ,Pn) for all P1, . . . ,Pn ∈PA and every permutation σ : I→ I.
Definition 11. Throughout this article we will suppose that A contains three or more alter-
natives. A voting systemC : P IA →PA will be called arrovian if it satisfies the axioms of
unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Remark 12. As a word of caution, we should point out that we allow the trivial voting
system C/0 : P IA →PA, C/0(P1, . . . ,Pn) = A×A, declaring all alternatives equivalent, in-
dependently of the preference profile (P1, . . . ,Pn). It satisfies all arrovian axioms except
strict unanimity and strong unanimity, but apart from serving as a counter-example it is
completely uninteresting. Most authors exclude trivial voting systems by demanding strict
unanimity, and we will recover this condition as a special case of our classification, see
Corollary 24. The weaker axiom of unanimity is preferable because it behaves well under
restriction of the electorate, see Remark 35.
2.3. Immediate consequences. We have already noticed that monotonicity implies IIA.
In the presence of three alternatives, these two axioms become equivalent:
Lemma 13. If there are at least three alternatives, then unanimity and independence of
irrelevant alternatives imply neutrality and monotonicity.
Proof. Consider a voting systemC : P IA→PA satisfying unanimity and independence of
irrelevant alternatives. We will first show neutrality, in a stronger form combining both
neutrality and independence of irrelevant alternatives:
Strong neutrality: Consider P = C(P1, . . . ,Pn) and P′ = C(P′1, . . . ,P
′
n): if {i | a <i
b}= {i | a′ <′i b′} and {i | b<i a}= {i | a′ <′i b′}, then a< b if and only if a′ <′ b′.
Given two alternatives a,b ∈ A, letX (a,b) be the set of all pairs (X ,Y ) such that a< b
with X = {i | a<i b} and Y = {i | a4i b}. We claim thatX (a,b) does not depend on the
specific alternatives a and b, that is,X (a,b) is the same for all pairs (a,b).
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We will first show that we can replace b by any other alternative b′ ∈ Ar{a,b}, accord-
ing to the following duplicated profile:
X ∩Y : a≈ b≈ b′
XrY : a b≈ b′
Y rX : a≺ b≈ b′
Ir (X ∪Y ) : a⊥ b≈ b′
Here b ≈ b′ by unanimity, hence a < b⇔ a < b′ and a 4 b⇔ a 4 b′. This proves that
X (a,b) = X (a,b′). Analogously we can replace a by any other alternative a′ ∈ Ar
{a,b}. This ultimately leads toX (a,b) =X (a′,b′) for all pairs (a,b) and (a′,b′).
In order to prove monotonicity, we want to compare two profiles P=C(P1, . . . ,Pn) and
P′ =C(P′1, . . . ,P
′
n) such that
X = {i | a<i b} ⊆ {i | a<′i b}= X ′,
Y = {i | b<i a} ⊇ {i | b<′i a}= Y ′.
Assuming a < b we want to show that a <′ b. We choose b′ ∈ Ar {a,b} and construct
a third profile P′′ = C(P′′1 , . . . ,P
′′
n ) that duplicates P on the pair (a,b) and P
′ on the pair
(a,b′). More explicitly, we require {i | a <′′i b} = X and {i | a <′′i b′} = X ′, as well as
{i | b <′′i a} = Y and {i | b′ <′′i a} = Y ′. By our hypothesis X ⊆ X ′ and Y ⊇ Y ′ we can
also impose b <′′i b′ for all i ∈ I. Now a < b implies a <′′ b, by IIA. Moreover we have
b <′′ b′ by unanimity, hence a <′′ b′ by transitivity. We conclude that a <′ b by IIA and
neutrality. 
3. DECISIVE SUBSETS
3.1. Definition and first properties. Decisive subsets are an important notion for the
analysis of voting systems. In the present context two different concepts will play a roˆle:
Definition 14. A subset J ⊆ I is called decisive for the pair (a,b) if aJ b implies a< b.
It is called strongly decisive for the pair (a,b) if already a<J b implies a< b.
Notice that for J to be decisive we only demand that aJ b imply a< b. The expected
stronger conclusion a b will be shown in Proposition 19, provided that the voting system
is non-trivial.3
Remark 15. The axiom of unanimity states that I is strongly decisive for every pair (a,b).
Obviously strongly decisive implies decisive. Given neutrality, if a subset is (strongly)
decisive for one pair (a,b), then it is (strongly) decisive for all pairs. Given monotonicity,
it suffices to consider the worst case:
(1) A subset J ⊆ I is decisive for (a,b) if and only if a J b on J and a ≺K b on the
complement K = Ir J imply a< b.
(2) A subset J ⊆ I is strongly decisive for (a,b) if and only if a≈J b on J and a≺K b
on the complement K = Ir J imply a< b.
Proposition 16 (Exclusion property). If J ⊆ I is strongly decisive, then the members of the
complement Ir J have no influence whatsoever on the outcome.
3 For the trivial voting system, the empty set J = /0 is decisive: aJ b is always true and implies a< b. (But
not a  b!) Conversely, if J = /0 is decisive, then the voting system is necessarily trivial. The trivial case is thus
completely harmless, and there is no need to disallow it. See Remark 35 for an argument in favour of this choice.
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Proof. Given two alternatives a,b ∈ A, we will show that the outcome for a and b depends
only on the sets X = { j ∈ J | a< j b} and Y = { j ∈ J | a4 j b}. Consider a third alternative
a′ ∈ Ar{a,b} and assume a′ <X b and a′ 4Y b, as well as a≈J a′. Then a≈ a′ because J
is strongly decisive. The preferences on {a′,b} determine the outcome on {a′,b}, and thus
the outcome on {a,b} because a ≈ a′. We can thus arbitrarily modify the preferences of
Ir J on {a,b} without changing the outcome. 
Proposition 17 (Intersection property). Suppose that the set A contains at least three alter-
natives and that the voting system C : P IA →PA satisfies unanimity and independence of
irrelevant alternatives. If J1 and J2 are two (strongly) decisive subsets of I, then so is their
intersection J = J1∩ J2. If the set I of voters is finite, then the intersection of all (strongly)
decisive subsets is the unique minimal (strongly) decisive subset.
Proof. Assume that J1 and J2 are decisive. Given aJ b we want to show that a< b. We
can choose a third alternative x ∈ Ar{a,b} and arrange aJ1 x and xJ2 b as follows:
J : a x b
J1r J : a,b x
Ir J1 : x a,b
We obtain a < x because J1 is decisive, and x < b because J2 is decisive, hence a < b by
transitivity. This proves that J = J1∩ J2 is decisive for (a,b), hence decisive by neutrality.
The argument for strongly decisive sets is analogous, by replacing “” with “<”. 
3.2. Characterizing minimality. We begin with a sufficient criterion for decisiveness:
Lemma 18. If a< b then the supporting set K = {i ∈ I | a<i b} is decisive.
Proof. Consider J = {i ∈ I | a ≺i b} and L = {i ∈ I | a ⊥i b}. We can choose a third
alternative c ∈ Ar {a,b} and assume b K c and b ≺J c and b ⊥L c. Transitivity entails
aK c and a≺J c. On L, however, there is no restriction on the relation between a and c,
and so we can choose a≺L c.
K : a< b c
J : a≺ b≺ c
L : a⊥ b⊥ c, a≺ c
By neutrality and monotonicity, a < b implies b < c, hence a < c by transitivity. Now
Remark 15 (1) applies and we conclude that K is decisive for (a,c), hence decisive. 
Proposition 19. For a decisive set K ⊆ I the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) K is minimal, that is, if K′ ⊆ K is decisive then K′ = K.
(2) K is the smallest decisive set, that is, if K′ is decisive then K ⊆ K′.
(3) Each member k ∈ K has veto power in the sense that a 6<k b implies a 6< b.
As a consequence, aK b implies a b, provided that the voting system is non-trivial.
Proof. The implication (1)⇒ (2) follows from Proposition 17: if K′ is decisive, then
K∩K′ is decisive, hence K = K∩K′ by minimality of K. This means that K ⊆ K′.
The implication (2)⇒ (3) follows from Lemma 18: if a< b then {i∈ I | a<i b} is deci-
sive. It necessarily contains the smallest decisive subset K, thus a<K b. By contraposition,
if a 6<k b for some k ∈ K then a 6< b.
The implication (3)⇒ (1) is clear: if K′ ⊆ K is decisive, then k ∈ KrK′ has no veto
power. This being excluded, we necessarily have K′ = K, i.e. K is minimal. 
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Remark 20 (Oligarchies). In the terminology of Weymark [13], following Gibbard [6],
the minimal decisive set K ⊆ I is an oligarchy, in the sense that its members can impose
a  b in the case of unanimity a K b, while each individual member k ∈ K has veto
power, i.e. a≺k b implies a 6< b. Weymark studied only voting systemsC : L IA →PA and
thus excluded incomparabilities in the individual preferences. The preceding proposition
proves the stronger version that a 6<k b implies a 6< b, which covers both a≺k b and a⊥k b.
Remark 21 (Arrow’s theorem). Our arguments also hold for voting systemsC : L IA→PA
defined on the subset LA ⊂PA of linear orderings. Restricting to this domain simplifies
the proofs, but does not change the results in an essential way.
Restricting the range, however, is more severe. If we consider C : L IA →LA, then the
minimal decisive subset K cannot contain more than one individual: if two individuals
i, j ∈ K have veto power, then a i b and a ≺ j b would imply a ⊥ b. We thus obtain, as a
by-product, Arrow’s classical dictator theorem. (We will come back to this in §4.4.)
Analogously, we have a sufficient criterion for strong decisiveness:
Lemma 22. If a≈ b then the supporting set N = {i ∈ I | a≈i b} is strongly decisive.
Proof. Consider J = {i ∈ I | ai b} and K = {i ∈ I | a≺i b} and L= {i ∈ I | a⊥i b}. We
choose a third alternative a′ ∈ Ar{a,b} and consider the following profile:
N : a′ ≈ a≈ b
J : a′  a b
K : a≺ a′ ≺ b
L : a≺ a′, a⊥ b, a′ ⊥ b
By neutrality, a ≈ b implies a′ ≈ b, whence a ≈ a′. Now Remark 15 (2) applies and we
conclude that N is strongly decisive for (a,a′), hence strongly decisive. 
Proposition 23. For a strongly decisive set J ⊆ I the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) J is minimal, that is, if J′ ⊆ J is strongly decisive then J′ = J.
(2) J is the smallest strongly decisive set, that is, if J′ is strongly decisive then J ⊆ J′.
(3) Each member j ∈ J has influence in the sense that a<J b and a j b imply a b.
In particular, the voting system satisfies strong unanimity if and only if the set I of all voters
is the minimal strongly decisive subset.
Proof. The implication (1)⇒ (2) follows from Proposition 17: if J′ is strongly decisive,
then so is J∩ J′, hence J = J∩ J′ by minimality of J. This means that J ⊆ J′.
The implication (2) ⇒ (3) follows from Lemma 22: if a ≈ b then {i ∈ I | a ≈i b}
is strongly decisive. It necessarily contains the smallest strongly decisive subset J, thus
a ≈J b. By contraposition, if a 6≈ j b for some j ∈ J then a 6≈ b. We conclude that a <J b
and a j b for some j ∈ J imply a b.
The implication (3)⇒ (1) is clear: if J′ ⊆ J is strongly decisive, then a ≈J′ b implies
a≈ b, and j ∈ Jr J′ has no influence on the outcome. 
Corollary 24. For an arrovian voting systemC : P IA→PA on three or more alternatives,
let K ⊆ J ⊆ I be the minimal decisive and strongly decisive subsets, respectively.
(1) C satisfies the axiom of strict unanimity if and only if K 6= /0, i.e. C is non-trivial.
(2) C satisfies the axiom of strong unanimity if and only if J = I. 
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Remark 25 (Revelation principle). From the very beginning of our discussion we have
supposed that the individual preferences P1, . . . ,Pn ∈PA are known, tacitly assuming that
all individuals truthfully reveal their preferences. From a game-theoretic point of view,
this assumption is consistent if revealing the true preferences is a Nash equilibrium: no
individual is better off by declaring another preference, or in other words, no individual
has an incentive to lie. Moreover, individuals have an incentive to truthfully reveal their
preferences if each individual preference can potentially decide the outcome. For this
strong form of Nash equilibrium it is necessary that C be strongly unanimous: if J ( I
is strongly decisive, then some individuals are systematically excluded from the decision
process and have no incentive whatsoever to reveal their preferences.
3.3. Juntas without internal structure. The preceding notions being in place, we can
now begin to classify the precise structure of arrovian voting systems. We will first treat
the simple case where decisive and strongly decisive subsets coı¨ncide. The general case is
more complex and will be treated in the next section.
Example 26. Choose a subset J ⊆ I and define the voting system CJ : P IA →PA by
CJ(P1, . . . ,Pn) :=
⋂
j∈J Pj. This implements the Pareto rule based on J, which means that
a< b if and only if a< j b for all j ∈ J. This can be seen as the “greatest common ordering”
unanimously agreed upon by all members of J. In the trivial case J = /0 we recover the
trivial voting systemC/0(P1, . . . ,Pn) = A×A.
It is easily verified that CJ satisfies the axioms of unanimity, neutrality, monotonicity,
and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Notice also that J is the smallest decisive
subset, and at the same time the smallest strongly decisive subset. This property is charac-
teristic in the following sense:
Proposition 27 (Classification of juntas without internal structure). Suppose that the set
A contains at least three alternatives and consider a voting system C : P IA →PA that
satisfies the axioms of unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let K ⊆ I be
the smallest decisive subset, and let J ⊆ I be the smallest strongly decisive subset. Then
we have the double inclusion CJ ⊆C ⊆CK , that is,⋂
j∈J Pj ⊆ C(P1, . . . ,Pn) ⊆
⋂
k∈K Pk
for all preference profiles (P1, . . . ,Pn) ∈P IA. Equality C =CJ or C =CK holds if and only
if K = J, that is, decisive and strongly decisive subsets coı¨ncide.
Proof. On the one hand, the fact that J is strongly decisive is equivalent to the inclusion⋂
j∈J Pj ⊆C(P1, . . . ,Pn) for all profiles (P1, . . . ,Pn) ∈P IA. On the other hand, according to
Proposition 19, each member k ∈ K has veto power in the sense that a 6<k b implies a 6< b.
This is equivalent toC(P1, . . . ,Pn)⊆⋂k∈K Pk. Obviously, ifC =CJ orC =CK then K = J.
Conversely, if K = J, then the above inclusions show thatC =CJ =CK . 
Proposition 28. The statement of the preceding proposition holds verbatim for voting
system C : L IA →PA defined only on the subsetLA ⊂PA of linear orderings.
Proof. We claim that the arguments developed for partial orderings still apply to linear
orderings, i.e. all the necessary constructions can be carried out withinL IA ⊂P IA.
First of all, the definition of (strongly) decisive sets applies to linear orderings (Defi-
nition 14). The intersection property remains valid and ensures the existence of a unique
minimal decisive set (Proposition 17). We still have the characterization of the minimal de-
cisive set in terms of veto power (Proposition 19); the proof is somewhat simplified by the
stronger hypothesis that individual preferences no longer present incomparabilities. 
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Corollary 29. The only arrovian voting systemsP IA →PA (or L IA →PA, respectively)
on three or more alternatives that satisfy anonymity are the trivial voting system C/0 and
the strong Pareto rule CI . Only CI satisfies anonymity and strong unanimity.
Proof. Let C : P IA →PA or C : L IA →PA be an arrovian voting system and let K be its
minimal decisive set. Anonymity implies K = /0 or K = I, thusC =C/0 orC =CI . 
Remark 30. AlthoughCJ fulfils the arrovian requirements, it is not at all satisfactory:
• In the extreme case J = { j} the voting systemCJ is dictatorial, with the individual
j as dictator. In order to integrate more individuals in the decision process, we
have to enlarge the set J, but there is a price to pay: we can no longer ensure a
complete ordering of alternatives. Even if we start out with complete orderings Pj,
their intersection P =
⋂
j∈J Pj may not be complete. In the worst case, we obtain
the trivial ordering P= A×A.
• In the other extreme, J = I, the mapCI is the strong Pareto rule. It is the consensus
in the strongest possible sense. Since each individual i∈ I has veto power, a single
deviant voter can annihilate this over-ambitious consensus: by insisting on a⊥i b
each one can enforce the outcome a ⊥ b. Even if we exclude incomparability
and consider CI : L IA →PA, the same happens for two opposing voters i, j with
preferences ai b and a≺ j b.
In particular we see that the voting system CJ wastes a lot of information: if J is small,
many individuals are excluded; if J is large, then the conclusions are diluted, to the extent
that quite often no conclusion whatsoever can be drawn. (Citizens of the European Union
can testify recent examples.) This is the classical dilemma between equity and efficiency,
which is the core problem in voting theory.
Remark 31. The general setting of partial orderings highlights the roˆle of completeness
in Arrow’s theorem: while in general any subset K ⊆ I can be an oligarchy, completeness
forces oligarchies to shrink to a single individual, whence the dictator theorem.
4. CLASSIFICATION OF ARROVIAN JUNTAS
4.1. Relatively decisive subsets. The preceding Proposition 27 characterizes arrovian
voting systems in which decisive and strongly decisive subsets coı¨ncide. In general they
differ, as shown by Example 36 below. In order to classify all possibilities, a more detailed
analysis is thus required. The appropriate refinement is that of relatively decisive subsets:
Definition 32. Let N ⊆ I be a subset and consider two alternatives a,b ∈ A. A subset
J ⊆ IrN is decisive relative to N for the pair (a,b) if a ≈N b and a J b together imply
a < b, independently of all other preferences. It is strongly decisive relative to N for the
pair (a,b) if a≈N b and a<J b together imply a< b.
Given neutrality, if a subset J is (strongly) decisive relative to N for one pair (a,b),
then it is (strongly) decisive relative to N for all pairs. In the latter case J is simply called
(strongly) decisive relative to N, without reference to any pair (a,b). Notice that in the
case N = /0 we recover the absolute version of (strong) decisiveness as in Definition 14.
The interpretation of relative decisiveness is as follows: if the members of N declare
themselves neutral in the sense that they regard a and b as being equivalent, then the de-
cision is left to the members of the complement IrN. This can be formalized as follows:
the inclusion IrN ↪→ I induces an inclusion φN : P IrNA ↪→P IA, (Pi)i∈IrN 7→ (Pi)i∈I by
extending with Pi = A×A for all i ∈ N. We can thus define the restricted voting system
CN :=C ◦φN : P IrNA ↪→P IA →PA.
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Proposition 33 (Restriction of the electorate). All arrovian axioms (except strict unanim-
ity) are hereditary in the sense that they remain valid when passing fromC to the restriction
CN . A subset J ⊆ IrN is (strongly) decisive relative to N if and only if J is (strongly) de-
cisive for the voting system CN . All properties established for (strongly) decisive sets thus
carry over to (strongly) decisive sets relative to N. In particular, if I is finite, then for each
N ⊆ I there exists a unique minimal decisive subset relative to N, denoted δN ⊆ IrN. 
For ease of notation it is sometimes more convenient to work with ∆N = δNunionsqN. Since
N∩δN = /0, we can recover the initial data via δN = ∆NrN.
Example 34 (Pareto rule). Consider CJ : P IA →PA, CJ(P1, . . . ,Pn) :=
⋂
j∈J Pj for some
fixed subset J ⊆ I. Here we find δN = JrN and ∆N = J∪N for all N ⊆ I.
Remark 35. In order to restrict the electorate as explained in Proposition 33, we have to
allow trivial voting systems: even if C is non-trivial, it may well be that CN is trivial. This
is the case if and only if N is strongly decisive for C, see Proposition 16. In particular, the
axiom of strict unanimity is not hereditary and thus technically quite cumbersome.
Trivial voting systems could be avoided by demanding strong unanimity. This axiom
is hereditary and our approach could thus be based on this stronger condition. For a finite
society I both choices are essentially equivalent: each voting systemP IA →PA satisfying
unanimity can be restricted toPJA →PA satisfying strong unanimity, where J ⊆ I is the
minimal strongly decisive subset. (See Propositions 16 and 23.)
4.2. Lexicographic voting rules. The voting rule CJ can be refined by introducing extra
structure. The idea is, as could be suspected, that all junta members are equal, but some
are more equal than others:
Example 36 (Lexicographic voting rule). Let Ω= {J1 ⊂ ·· · ⊂ J`} be an ascending chain
of non-empty subsets Jλ ⊆ I. We can then define LexΩ : P IA →PA as follows: Given
two alternatives a,b ∈ A, we set a ≈ b if and only if a ≈J b for all J ∈ Ω. Otherwise,
let J ∈ Ω be the smallest set for which we do not have a ≈J b; we then set a < b if and
only if a <J b, and symmetrically a 4 b if and only if a 4J b. This is the lexicographic
voting rule associated to the chainΩ: one can interpretΩ as a hierarchically ordered junta,
with J1 being the inner circle, J2 being the enlarged inner circle, etc. Only in the case of
indifference is the decision passed down in the hierarchy.
Example 37 (Strong lexicographic voting rule). Given a chain Ω= {J1 ⊂ ·· · ⊂ J`} we set
J0 = /0 and Jλ = J` for all λ ≥ `. The lexicographic voting rule LexΩ : P IA→PA can then
be rephrased as follows: we have a< b if and only if there exists J = Jλ and K = Jλ+1rJλ
such that a <J b and a <K b but not a ≈K b. By a slight modification, we define another
voting rule Lex′Ω : P
I
A →PA as follows: we set a < b if and only if there exists J = Jλ
and K = Jλ+1r Jλ such that a <J b and a K b. This is called the strong lexicographic
voting rule associated to the chainΩ. As long as a<J b, the decision is passed down in the
hierarchy until the relatively decisive set K agrees on a strict preference aK b.
Proposition 38. For every chain Ω the voting rules LexΩ and Lex′Ω satisfy the axioms of
unanimity, neutrality, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
For LexΩ we find δΩN = /0 if J` ⊆ N, and otherwise δΩN = Jλ rN where Jλ ∈ Ω is
the smallest subset such that Jλ 6⊆ N. For Lex′Ω we find δ ′ΩN = /0 if J` ⊆ N, and otherwise
δ ′ΩN = Jλ+1rN where Jλ ∈Ω is the smallest subset such that Jλ+1∩N ⊆ Jλ .
In both cases we obtain ∆ /0 = J1, ∆J1 = J2, . . . , ∆J`−1 = J`, ∆J` = J`, in particular the
voting rule LexΩ or Lex′Ω uniquely determines the chain Ω used in its construction. 
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More generally, we can associate to each arrovian voting systemC : P IA →PA a chain
Ω of subsets of I by setting J0 := /0 and inductively Jλ+1 := ∆Jλ . This data partitions
arrovian voting systems into certain families, each associated to some chain Ω. In each
such family, Lex′Ω and LexΩ are the least and the greatest element, respectively:
Proposition 39. For every arrovian voting system C : P IA →PA there exists a unique
chain Ω of subsets of I such that Lex′Ω ⊆C ⊆ LexΩ, namely the chain inductively defined
by J0 := /0 and Jλ+1 := ∆Jλ . We have LexΩ = Lex′Ω if and only if the chain Ω is built by
adding one element at a time, i.e. Jλ+1 = Jλ unionsq{ jλ+1} for all λ < `.
Proof. We will first establish the existence of a suitable chainΩ. GivenC : P IA→PA, we
set J0 := /0 and inductively define Jλ+1 := ∆Jλ . Since I is finite, this sequence will stabilize
with some J` = ∆J`. We thus obtain an ascending chain Ω= {J1 ⊂ ·· · ⊂ J`}.
• In order to show Lex′Ω⊆C consider J= Jλ andK= Jλ+1rJλ . We haveK= δJ by
construction. As a consequence, if a≈J b and aK b then a< b. By monotonicity,
the same holds true if a<J b and aK b. This proves the inclusion Lex′Ω ⊆C.
• In order to show C ⊆ LexΩ suppose that a< b. The inclusion is obvious if a≈J b
for all J ∈ Ω. Otherwise there exists J = Jλ and K = Jλ+1r Jλ such that a ≈J b
but not a ≈K b. Since K is the minimal decisive set relative to J, we have a <K b
by Proposition 19. This proves the inclusionC ⊆ LexΩ.
Conversely, suppose that Ω = {J1 ⊂ ·· · ⊂ J`} is a chain such that Lex′Ω ⊆ C ⊆ LexΩ.
The inclusion Lex′Ω ⊆C implies that J1 is decisive for C, and C ⊆ LexΩ implies that J1 is
minimal (see Proposition 19). This argument can be iterated: Jλ+1rJλ is decisive relative
to Jλ because Lex′Ω ⊆C, and minimal because C ⊆ LexΩ. We conclude that J1 = ∆ /0 and
inductively Jλ+1 = ∆Jλ for all λ . 
4.3. Coalition structure of arrovian juntas. The notion of relatively decisive subsets has
allowed us to analyze examples such as LexΩ and Lex′Ω. As a final step, we will now use
it to classify all arrovian voting systems for a finite society I:
Theorem 40. Given an arrovian voting system C : P IA →PA on three or more alterna-
tives, there exists a map δ : 2I → 2I such that δN is the minimal decisive set relative to N.
Moreover, ∆ : 2I → 2I , ∆N = δNunionsqN, is the unique map enjoying the following properties:
(1) N ⊆ ∆N and ∆M ⊆ ∆N for all M ⊆ N ⊆ I. (Monotonicity)
(2) If ∆N∩M = /0 for some N,M ⊆ I, then ∆(NunionsqM) = ∆NunionsqM. (Minimality)
(3) We have a< b if and only if a≈N b and aδN b for some N ⊆ I. (Decisiveness)
Conversely, given an arbitrary map ∆ : 2I → 2I satisfying (1), we set δN = ∆N rN
and define a map C∆ : P IA →PA by the rule (3). The resulting voting system C∆ satisfies
the arrovian axioms of unanimity, neutrality, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant
alternatives. Condition (2) ensures that δN is the minimal decisive set relative to N.
Before proving this theorem, let us clarify some details and reformulations:
Lemma 41. If (1) holds, then (2) becomes equivalent to the following weaker condition:
(2’) If ∆N∩M = /0 for some N,M ⊆ I, then ∆(NunionsqM)⊆ ∆NunionsqM.
Proof. Obviously (2) implies (2’). Given (1), M ⊆ N unionsqM implies ∆M ⊆ ∆(N unionsqM), and
N ⊆ N unionsqM implies ∆N ⊆ ∆(N unionsqM). We obtain ∆N ∪∆M ⊆ ∆(N unionsqM), and in particular
∆NunionsqM ⊆ ∆(NunionsqM). This proves that (1) and (2’) imply (2). 
Lemma 42. If (1) holds, then (3) becomes equivalent to the following condition:
(3’) We have a< b if and only if a<N b and aδN b for some N ⊆ I.
ARROVIAN JUNTAS 15
Proof. Obviously, if a≈N b and aδN b, then a<N b and aδN b. Conversely, if a<N b
and a δN b, then a ≈N′ b and a K b for N′ = {i ∈ N | a ≈i b} and K = δN unionsq (NrN′).
By (1) we have δN′ ⊆ δN ⊆ K, hence a≈N′ b and aδN′ b as desired. 
Lemma 43. If (2) holds, then (3) becomes equivalent to the following condition:
(3”) We have a< b if and only if aδN′ b for N′ = {i ∈ I | a≈i b}.
Proof. We only have to show that a ≈N b and a δN for some N ⊆ I imply a δN′ for
the possibly larger set N′. Obviously M = N′rN is disjoint from δN. Condition (2) now
ensures that δN′ = δN, hence aδN′ b as desired. 
Lemma 44. If a< b, then K = {i ∈ I | ai b} is decisive relative to N = {i ∈ I | a≈i b}.
Proof. This is a consequence of Lemma 18: restricting to the electorate IrN we have
K = {i ∈ IrN | a<i b}. 
Proof of Theorem 40. We already know from Lemma 13 that every arrovian voting system
C : P IA →PA satisfies neutrality and monotonicity. If I is finite then we can construct the
map δ : 2I → 2I , N 7→ δN, by applying Proposition 33. Condition (3) holds by construction
of δ and the preceding Lemma 44. Turning to Condition (1), we first remark that N ⊆ ∆N
by definition of ∆. Consider M ⊆ N ⊆ I: we know that a ≈N b and a δN b imply a < b.
For K = ∆NrM, monotonicity of C ensures that a ≈M b and a K b imply a < b. This
means that δM ⊆ K, hence ∆M ⊆ ∆N, as claimed. For (2), we know that a ≈N b and
a δN b imply a < b, independently of all other preferences. If ∆N ∩M = /0, then we can
additionally assume a≈M b and still conclude a< b. Thus δ (NunionsqM)⊆ δN, or equivalently,
∆(NunionsqM)⊆ ∆NunionsqM. For the inverse inclusion see Lemma 41.
In order to prove uniqueness we have to show, for every map ∆ : 2I → 2I satisfying
(1), (2), (3), that δN = ∆NrN is the smallest decisive set relative to N. To begin with,
Condition (3) states that δN is decisive relative to N. Conversely, consider an arbitrary set
K ⊆ IrN that is decisive relative N. By definition, a≈N b and aK b imply a< b, even if
a≺J b on J = Ir(NunionsqK). According to Condition (3) there exists N′ ⊆ I such that a≈N′ b
and a δN′ b. We necessarily have N′ ⊆ N and δN′ ⊆ K. Since M = NrN′ is disjoint
from δN′, Condition (2) implies that δN = δN′. We conclude that δN ⊆ K, which means
that δK is indeed the smallest decisive set relative to N.
Conversely, given ∆ : 2I → 2I satisfying (1), we have to verify that the associated voting
system C∆ : P IA →PA is well-defined: the outcome is obviously a reflexive relation, and
the only delicate point is transitivity. Given a < b and b < c we want to show a < c. We
know that a≈N1 b and aδN1 b, as well as b≈N2 c and bδN2 c, for some N1,N2 ⊆ I. We
thus have a ≈N c on the intersection N = N1 ∩N2, and a K c on K = (∆N1 ∩∆N2)rN.
Condition (1) ensures that ∆N ⊆ ∆N1 and ∆N ⊆ ∆N2, thus ∆N ⊆ ∆N1∩∆N2. This proves
that δN ⊆ K, whence aδN c. The defining rule (3) now says that a< c, as desired.
Having proved that the mapC∆ : P IA→PA is well-defined, we conclude that it satisfies
the arrovian axioms: unanimity, neutrality, and independence of irrelevant alternatives are
clear by (3), while monotonicity follows from (1). Finally, it remains to show for C∆ that
δN = ∆NrN is indeed the smallest decisive set relative to N: given conditions (1), (2),
and (3), this follows from the uniqueness proved above. 
Remark 45. The theorem asserts that every arrovian voting systemC : P IA→PA on three
or more alternatives is characterized by the associated map ∆ : 2I → 2I . In particular we
can extract the usual global information: K = ∆ /0 is the smallest decisive subset, whereas
the union J =
⋃
λ ∆λK is the smallest strongly decisive subset. More precisely, we can
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recover the chain Ω = {J1 ⊂ ·· · ⊂ J`} defined by J1 = K and Jλ+1 := ∆Jλ . According to
Proposition 39 we have Lex′Ω ⊆C ⊆ LexΩ but in general the inclusion can be strict.
Example 46. The smallest voting systems that are not of lexicographic type occur for
three voters. Example 3 illustrates that the classification is not exhausted by lexicographic
voting systems alone. Here we find the chainΩ= {{1,2} ⊂ {1,2,3}}. We haveC 6= LexΩ
because ∆C{1} = {1,2,3} but ∆Ω{1} = {1,2}. Likewise C 6= Lex′Ω because ∆C{2} =
{1,2} but ∆′Ω{2}= {1,2,3}. We conclude that Lex′Ω (C ( LexΩ.
Corollary 47. We have C ⊆ C′ if and only if ∆ ⊇ ∆′. More explicitely, C(P1, . . . ,Pn) ⊆
C′(P1, . . . ,Pn) for all profiles (P1, . . . ,Pn) ∈P IA if and only if ∆N ⊇ ∆′N for all N ⊆ I.
Proof. We first recall that ∆N = δN unionsqN and ∆′N = δ ′N unionsqN, which means that the condi-
tions ∆N ⊇ ∆′N and δN ⊇ δ ′N are equivalent.
(⇒)GivenC⊆C′ we want to show that every subset K ⊆ I that is decisive forC relative
to N is also decisive for C′ relative to N. Consider a ≈N b and a K b and a ≺L b on the
complement L = Ir (N unionsqK). Since K is decisive relative to N we know that a < b, and
fromC ⊆C′ we deduce a<′ b. We conclude that K is decisive forC′ relative to N.
(⇐) We suppose that every subset K ⊆ I that is decisive for C relative to N is also
decisive for C′ relative to N. If a < b then K = {i | a i b} is decisive for C relative to
N = {i | a ≈i b}. By hypothesis, K is also decisive for C′ relative to N. We conclude that
a<′ b, as claimed. 
4.4. Back to linear orderings. The preceding proofs show a little more than stated in
the Classification Theorem 40: one can weaken the requirements by demanding that the
voting systemC be only defined on the subsetLA ⊂PA of linear orderings (i.e. complete
preorders as opposed to partial preorders). We thus obtain the following result:
Corollary 48. For every arrovian voting system C : L IA →PA on three or more alterna-
tives there exists a unique map ∆ : 2I → 2I satisfying the conditions of Theorem 40 such
that C =C∆|L IA.
Proof. As explained in the proof of Proposition 28, the arguments developed in §3 for
partial orderings also apply to linear orderings, and all constructions can be carried out
withinL IA ⊂P IA. We can then consider relatively decisive subsets (Definition 32), and the
argument of restricting the electorate works as before (Proposition 33). In particular, for
each N ⊆ I there exists a unique minimal decisive subset relative to N, denoted δN ⊆ IrN.
The proof of Theorem 40 then translates verbatim to a proof of Corollary 48. 
One could also strengthen the requirements and demand that C take values in the set of
linear orderings. Here is a typical example:
Example 49. We consider a family pi = (k1, . . . ,k`) of distinct elements of I and define
Lexpi : L IA → LA as follows: We set a ≈ b if and only if a ≈k b for each k = k1, . . . ,k`.
Otherwise, let k be the first element in the family k1, . . . ,k` with a 6≈k b, and set either
a  b if a k b, or a ≺ b if a ≺k b. This is the lexicographic voting rule associated to
the family pi = (k1, . . . ,k`). As indicated, kλ has priority over kλ+1, and only in the case
of indifference is the decision passed down in the hierarchy. Notice that K = {k1} is the
minimal decisive set, whereas J = {k1, . . . ,k`} is the minimal strongly decisive set, and pi
is a permutation of the set J.
Although the change of domain from P IA to L
I
A has turned out to be insignificant,
changing the range fromPA toLA alters the classification result dramatically. We are led
to the following refinement of Arrow’s dictator theorem, as stated in Theorem 7:
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Corollary 50 (Refined version of Arrow’s dictator theorem). Suppose that the set A con-
tains at least three alternatives. Then every mapC : L IA →LA that satisfies unanimity and
IIA is a lexicographic voting rule of the formC= Lexpi for a unique family pi = (k1, . . . ,k`).
Proof. Via the inclusionLA ⊂PA, we can apply the previous classification theorem to the
map C : L IA →PA. For each N ⊆ I, the minimal relatively decisive subset δN contains
at most one element. If it contained two different elements i, j ∈ K, then a ≈N b together
with ai b and a≺ j b would imply a⊥ b, and C would not map toLA. (Recall that i and
j have veto power, see Proposition 19.)
Let K = δ /0 be the minimal decisive subset. If K = /0 then C is the trivial voting system
and we conclude that ` = 0. Otherwise K contains exactly one element, K = {k1}, with
k1 being the dictator. In this case, δ{k1} is either empty or contains exactly one element,
δ{k1} = {k2}. In the latter case we find δ{k1,k2} = /0 or δ{k1,k2} = {k3}. Iterating this
argument, we obtain a family pi = (k1, . . . ,k`) of distinct elements of I. We conclude that
C = Lexpi according to Proposition 39. 
Remark 51. If we insist that the voting system be strongly unanimous, then the only
solutions are of the form Lexpi where pi = (k1, . . . ,kn) is a permutation of the entire set I.
There are thus precisely n! voting systems C : L IA →LA that are strongly unanimous and
independent of irrelevant alternatives. Even though dictatorial, they have the advantage to
extract a maximum of information within the arrovian setting. The only point of unfairness,
of course, is the arbitrary choice of the permutation pi , that is, the order of individuals in
the hierarchy.
5. INFINITE SOCIETIES
We conclude this article by adapting our arguments to the case where the set I of voters
is infinite. The results are more involved but nevertheless illuminating by placing the finite
case in a wider perspective. As before,P IA denotes the set of all preference profiles (Pi)i∈I ,
or equivalently, of all maps I→PA, i 7→ Pi.
5.1. Lexicographic voting rules. For infinite societies, lexicographic voting rules can be
defined as in Examples 36 and 37. Here we consider a chain Ω ⊆ 2I , i.e. a collection of
subsets of I that is linearly ordered by inclusion. The only subtlety is that Ω must be well-
ordered, that is, every non-empty subsetΩ′⊆Ω has a minimal element, i.e. the intersection⋂
J∈Ω′ J is again an element of Ω′. (This is automatically satisfied if Ω is finite.)
Proposition 52 (Lexicographic voting rule). If Ω ⊆ 2I is a well-ordered chain, then the
voting systems LexΩ,Lex′Ω : P
I
A→PA are well-defined and satisfy the axioms of unanim-
ity, neutrality, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
As a special case, consider a subset J ⊆ I equipped with some well-ordering ≤. Then
the initial segments J j = {i ∈ J | i ≤ j} form a well-ordered chain Ω = {J j | j ∈ J}. The
associated voting rule Lex(J,≤) = LexΩ = Lex′Ω works as follows: we have a ≈ b if and
only if a ≈J b. Otherwise let j ∈ J be the smallest element such that a 6≈ j b; we then
set a < b if and only if a < j b, and symmetrically a 4 b if and only if a 4 j b. As a
concrete example, consider Lex(N,≤) : PNA →PA where J = N is ordered as usual, thus
Ω= {{1} ⊂ {1,2} ⊂ {1,2,3} ⊂ . . .}.
Proposition 53 (Strict lexicographic voting rule). Suppose that J ⊆ I is equipped with
some well-ordering ≤. Then the voting system Lex(J,≤) : P IA →PA maps L IA to LA.
Moreover, for each N ⊆ I there exists a unique minimal decisive subset δN ⊆ IrN: we
have δN = /0 if and only if J ⊆ N, and otherwise δN = {min(JrN)}. 
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5.2. Principal voting systems. The uniqueness of a minimal decisive subset K ⊆ I re-
mains valid even if the set I of voters is infinite: if two subsets K1,K2 ⊆ I are decisive and
minimal, then their intersection is decisive, hence K1 = K1∩K2 = K2 by minimality.
Our hypothesis that the set I be finite is crucial, however, for establishing the existence
of a minimal decisive set:
Example 54. Consider an infinite set I and define C : P IA →PA by the rule a< b if and
only if a<i b for all but finitely many voters i ∈ I. Here every finite set J ⊆ I is negligible
since it has no influence on the outcome. Conversely, a subset J ⊆ I is decisive if and only
if it has finite complement Ir J. There is, however, no minimal such set.
Definition 55. An arrovian voting system C : P IA →PA is called principal if for each
N ⊆ I there exists a minimal subsetM ⊆ IrN that is decisive relative to N. In this caseM
is uniquely determined by N and will be denoted by δN as before.
Remark 56. Every arrovian voting system on a finite set of voters I is principal. For an
infinite society, C : P IA →PA can be principal, for example Lex(J,≤), or non-principal,
as in the preceding Example 54. For principal voting systems the Classification Theorem
40 holds verbatim: given the existence of δN, the finiteness of I is not used in the proof.
Likewise we have the variant for linear orderings formulated in Corollary 48.
Definition 57. Every well-ordered chain Ω of subsets of I can be uniquely indexed by
ordinal numbers λ such that Ω = {Jλ | λ ≤ `} and Jκ ⊂ Jλ for κ < λ . We say that Ω is
continuously well-ordered if Jλ =
⋃
κ<λ Jκ for every limit ordinal λ .
Proposition 58. For every principal arrovian voting system C : P IA →PA there exists a
unique continuously well-ordered chain Ω such that Lex′Ω ⊆C ⊆ LexΩ, namely the chain
inductively defined by J0 := /0, and Jλ+1 := ∆Jλ . We have LexΩ = Lex′Ω if and only if the
chain Ω is built by adding one element at a time, i.e. Jλ+1 = Jλ unionsq{ jλ+1} for all λ < `.
Proof. By hypothesis, C is principal, so for each N ⊆ I we can consider the minimal
relatively decisive set δN. We set ∆N = δN unionsqN and define J0 := /0, and inductively
Jλ+1 := ∆Jλ . In the case of an infinite set I, we proceed by transfinite induction, setting
Jλ :=
⋃
κ<λ Jκ for every limit ordinal λ . Since I is a set, this process must stop with ∆J` =
J` for some ordinal `, and we obtain a continuously well-ordered chain Ω= {Jλ | λ ≤ `}.
The double inclusion Lex′Ω ⊆C ⊆ LexΩ follows as in the proof of Proposition 39, and the
uniqueness argument generalizes verbatim to continuously well-ordered chains. 
We are now in position to prove the converse of Proposition 53 and thus characterize
strict lexicographic voting rules. We obtain the following refined version of Arrow’s dicta-
tor theorem, which comprises the finite and the infinite case:
Theorem 59. Suppose that C : P IA→PA is a principal arrovian voting system that maps
L IA toLA. Then we haveC= Lex(J,≤) for some subset J⊆ I equipped with a well-ordering
≤, and the pair (J,≤) is uniquely determined by C.
Conversely, every pair (J,≤) can be realized in this way, thus establishing a bijection
between the said voting systems and well-ordered sets (J,≤) with J ⊆ I.
Moreover, strong unanimity is equivalent to J = I. Principal arrovian voting system
C : P IA →PA that map L IA to LA and satisfy strong unanimity are thus in bijective cor-
respondence with well-orderings of the electorate I.
Proof. By Proposition 58, we have Lex′Ω ⊆ C ⊆ LexΩ for a unique continuously well-
ordered chain Ω, but in general this inclusion may be strict. We will now exploit the
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hypothesis that C(L IA) ⊆LA. As shown in the proof of Corollary 50, each δN is either
empty or consists of a single individual. The set J = J` becomes well-ordered via the
bijection λ 7→ jλ defined by the condition Jλ+1r Jλ = { jλ+1}. According to Proposition
58, we conclude thatC = Lex(J,≤) and the pair (J,≤) is uniquely determined byC. 
5.3. The filter of decisive subsets. For non-principal voting systems we will now explain
how to generalize the Classification Theorem 40. As P.C. Fishburn [5] pointed out, the
familyF of decisive sets forms a filter in the following sense:
Definition 60. A filter on a set I is a collection of subsetsF ⊆ 2I such that
(F1) If K ⊆ J ⊆ I, then K ∈F implies J ∈F .
(F2) We have I ∈F , that is,F is non-empty.
(F3) If K,J ∈F , then K∩ J ∈F .
Given K ⊆ I the collection (K) = {J ⊆ I | K ⊆ J} is the principal filter generated by K.
One has /0 ∈F if and only ifF is the trivial filter, i.e.F = ( /0) = 2I . A filterF is called
proper if /0 /∈F . An ultrafilter on I is a maximal proper filter.
Remark 61. Following Bourbaki [4, §I.6.1], most authors demand /0 /∈F as a fourth filter
axiom. We will not do so here because trivial filters naturally occur in the sequel, as the
decisive sets of trivial voting systems. Moreover, a filter on a set I is analogous to an ideal
in a ring R, and this definition usually includes the ring itself as the trivial ideal.4 If this is
to be excluded, one should speak of proper ideals. We will conform our notation to this
algebraic analogy, and thus speak of proper filters if we wish to exclude the trivial case.
Remark 62. If a filterF contains a minimal element K, then K is unique andF = (K) is
the principal filter generated by K. If I is infinite then a filterF does not necessarily have
a minimal element: consider the filter F of all cofinite subsets K ⊆ I, that is, subsets K
with finite complement IrK. (This is called the Fre´chet filter on I.)
Remark 63. Given an element i ∈ I, the principal filter ({i}) is an ultrafilter. If I is
finite, then every ultrafilter F is of the form F = ({i}). In general, the axiom of choice
guarantees that every proper filter is contained in some ultrafilter. A filterF is an ultrafilter
if and only if for every subset K ⊆ I one has either K ∈F or IrK ∈F . [4, §I.6.4]
Given a filter F we define a <F b to signify a <J b for some J ∈ F . In the case
of a principal filter F = (K) we have that a <(K) b is equivalent to a <K b, as defined
previously. Analogously we define aF b to signify aJ b for some J ∈F , etc.
The following result was first published by A.P. Kirman and D. Sondermann [8], and
implicitly in P.C. Fishburn’s previous article [5]. Essentially, it had already been discovered
by G.Th. Guilbaud [7] in 1952.5 In order to make our presentation self-contained, we will
state and prove the essential observation needed for our classification:
Proposition 64 (Filter of decisive subsets). For every arrovian voting system C : P IA →
PA on three or more alternatives, the family F of decisive sets is a filter on I. The same
holds true for the subfamilyF ′ ⊆F of strongly decisive sets. Moreover, if C mapsL IA to
LA, thenF is either trivial or an ultrafilter on I.
4 An ideal S in a ring (R,+, ·) is a subset S⊆ R such that (i) r · s ∈ S for all r ∈ R and s ∈ S, (ii) 0 ∈ S, that is,
S is non-empty, and (iii) s+ t ∈ S for all s, t ∈ S. If we replace the ring (R,+, ·) by the boolean algebra (2I ,∩,∪),
then the conditions (i),(ii),(iii) translate to the filter axioms (F1),(F2),(F3). Notice that 0∈ R is the neutral element
with respect to addition +, while I ∈ 2I is the neutral element with respect to intersection ∩.
5 I thank Bernard Monjardet for pointing out this reference to me and for highlighting the importance of
Guilbaud’s early contribution to modern social choice theory. For a recent historical account see [10].
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Conversely, every filter F on I defines an arrovian voting system CF : P IA →PA by
setting a < b if and only if a <F b, and in this case F is the filter of decisive sets and
also the filter of strongly decisive sets. IfF = (K) is principal, then C(K) =CK as defined
previously. IfF is either trivial or an ultrafilter on I, then CF mapsL IA toLA.
Proof. For every arrovian voting system C, the family F resp. F ′ is a filter: it satisfies
(F1) by monotonicity, (F2) by unanimity, and (F3) by Proposition 17.
Suppose, moreover, that C(L IA) ⊆ LA. Consider a subset J ⊆ I and its complement
K = IrJ. For a profile with aJ b and a≺K b we have two possible outcomes: according
to Remark 15 (1), if a< b then J is decisive; if a4 b then K is decisive. If we had both, then
their intersection J ∩K = /0 would be decisive and C would be the trivial voting system.
This being excluded, we conclude thatF is an ultrafilter.
Conversely, a filter F allows to define a map CF : P IA →PA. First of all we have
to show that this is well-defined. Obviously, the outcome is a reflexive relation because
I ∈F . The only delicate point is transitivity: given a< b and b< c, we know that a<K1 b
and b <K2 c for some K1,K2 ∈F . We thus have a <K c on the intersection K = K1∩K2.
Condition (F3) ensures that K ∈F , and hence a< c, as desired.
Having proved that CF : P IA →PA is well-defined, we conclude that it satisfies the
arrovian axioms: neutrality, monotonicity and independence of irrelevant alternatives are
clear by construction. Unanimity follows since I ∈F , as ensured by condition (F2). By
definition, each set J ∈F is decisive for the voting systemCF . Conversely a subset J ⊆ I
is decisive if and only if K ⊆ J for some K ∈F . Hence Condition (F1) ensures thatF is
the family of decisive sets forCF .
Suppose, moreover, thatF is an ultrafilter. Given two alternatives a,b ∈ A consider the
set J = {i∈ I | a<i b} and its complement K = {i∈ I | a≺i b}. SinceF is an ultrafilter we
have either J ∈F or K ∈F . This shows that a< b or a4 b, in other words, the outcome
is a complete ordering. 
As in the finite case, it is easiest to classify voting systems for which decisive and
strongly decisive subsets coı¨ncide:
Proposition 65 (Classification of juntas without internal structure). Given an arrovian
voting system C : P IA →PA on three or more alternatives, let F be the filter of decisive
sets, and let F ′ ⊆F be the filter of strongly decisive sets. We have the double inclusion
CF ′ ⊆ C ⊆ CF , and equality C = CF or C = CF ′ holds if and only if F =F ′, that is,
each decisive set is also strongly decisive.
Proof. This is a variation of Proposition 27. The inclusion CF ′ ⊆C is clear by definition
of strong decisiveness. In order to showC⊆CF we appeal to Lemma 18: given a< b, the
supporting set K = {i ∈ I | a<i b} is decisive, hence a<K b with K ∈F . 
5.4. Relatively decisive subsets. The preceding Proposition 65 characterizes voting sys-
tems in which decisive and strongly decisive subsets coı¨ncide. In general they differ, as
shown by lexicographic voting rules (see §5.1 above). In order to classify all possibilities,
we thus take up the detailed analysis and consider the filter ∂N on IrN of decisive sub-
sets relative to N, following Proposition 33. If I is finite then this is simply the principal
filter ∂N = (δN), but in the infinite case ∂N may not be principal, so that the language of
filters is appropriate. We can now reformulate the principal classification, Theorem 40, by
replacing the set δN with the filter ∂N, which leads to Theorem 67 stated below.
We will end this tour de force in set-theoretic abstraction by adding one final level of
technicality. For infinite sets I it is sometimes inappropriate to consider arbitrary subsets
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K ⊆ I, that is, it may be necessary to work with some restricted family Σ ⊆ 2I . (See
T.E. Armstrong [1, 2].) Typically this occurs when (I,Σ,µ) is a measure space: quite often
the measure µ : Σ→ R+ is defined only on Σ because it cannot be extended to the whole
set 2I . Consider for example I = R and µ : Σ→ R+ the Lebesgue-measure defined on the
family Σ of Lebesgue-measurable sets. Here the axiom of choice implies that Σ 6= 2R.
All that has been said and done in this article generalizes in an obvious way to the
measurable context. To be explicit, we demand Σ to be an algebra in the following sense,
and that all subsets and filters respect this algebra:
Definition 66. An algebra on a set I is a collection of subsets Σ⊆ 2I such that
(1) We have I ∈ Σ, and K ∈ Σ implies IrK ∈ Σ.
(2) If K,J ∈ Σ, then K∪ J and K∩ J are elements of Σ.
The elements of Σ are called measurable sets, and the pair (I,Σ) is called a measurable
space. A filter in an algebra Σ is a subsetF ⊆ Σ such that
(F1) If K,J ∈ Σ, then K ∈F and K ⊆ J imply J ∈F .
(F2) We have I ∈F , that is,F is non-empty.
(F3) If K,J ∈F , then K∩ J ∈F .
Given a measurable space (I,Σ) and a set K ∈ Σ, the collection (K) = {J ∈ Σ | K ⊆ J}
is called the principal filter generated by K. One has /0 ∈F if and only ifF is the trivial
filter, i.e. F = ( /0) = Σ. A filter F is called proper if /0 /∈ F . An ultrafilter in Σ is a
maximal proper filter in Σ.
We define P I,ΣA to be the family of measurable preference profiles (Pi)i∈I , that is, we
demand the set {i∈ I | a<i b} to be measurable for each pair of alternatives a,b∈ A. Since
Σ is an algebra, all relevant subsets of I thus become measurable, such as {i ∈ I | a ≈i b},
or {i ∈ I | ai b}, or {i ∈ I | a⊥i b}, etc.
A voting system for the society (I,Σ) is a map C : P I,ΣA →PA, and the arrovian ax-
ioms can be formulated as before. (Notice that Σ = 2I corresponds to a set I without any
measurability restrictions.) If there are at least three alternatives, then unanimity and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives imply neutrality and monotonicity (Lemma 13). More-
over, the (strongly) decisive subsets K ∈ Σ form a filter in the algebra Σ, and the preceding
Propositions 64 and 65 still hold.
As in Proposition 33, it is possible to restrict the electorate to IrN for every measurable
set N ∈ Σ, by passing from Σ to ΣN = {KrN | K ∈ Σ}, the restricted algebra on IrN. As
before, this trick allows to define ∂N ⊆ ΣN , the filter of decisive subsets relative to N.
5.5. Voting systems for measurable societies. Armed with the appropriate notation, the
Classification Theorem now translates to arrovian voting systems C : P I,ΣA →PA for the
measurable society (I,Σ). For ease of notation we define a map D : Σ→ FΣ, where FΣ is
the set of filtersF ⊆ Σ, by DN = ∂N+N = {JunionsqN | J ∈ ∂N} ⊆ (N). Since ∂N ⊆ ΣN , we
can recover the initial data via ∂N =DN−N = {JrN | J ∈DN}.
In order to translate Theorem 40 to Theorem 67 we remark that J ⊆ K is equivalent
to (K) ⊆ (J), so that the inclusions in condition (1) have to be reversed. The hypothesis
∆N ∩M = /0 can be reformulated as ∆N ⊆ IrM, or equivalently (IrM) ⊆ (∆N), and
replacing the principal filter (∆N) by the filter DN leads to the formulation of condition
(2) in the general setting.
Theorem 67. Assume that A contains three or more alternatives, and let (I,Σ) be a mea-
surable space as above. For every arrovian voting system C : P I,ΣA →PA there exists a
map ∂ that associates to each set N ∈ Σ the filter ∂N ⊆ ΣN of decisive sets relative to N.
22 MICHAEL EISERMANN
Moreover, D : Σ→ FΣ, DN = ∂N+N, is the unique map enjoying the following proper-
ties:
(1) DN ⊆ (N) and DN ⊆DM for all M ⊆ N with M,N ∈ Σ. (Monotonicity)
(2) If M ∈ Σ and (IrM)⊆DN then D(NunionsqM) =DN+M. (Minimality)
(3) We have a< b if and only if a≈N b and a∂N b for some N ∈ Σ. (Decisiveness)
Conversely, given an arbitrary map D : Σ→ FΣ satisfying (1), we set ∂N = DN−N
and define a mapCD : P I,ΣA →PA by the rule (3). The resulting voting systemCD satisfies
the arrovian axioms of unanimity, neutrality, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant
alternatives. Condition (2) ensures that ∂N is the filter of decisive sets relative to N.
Finally, the voting system C maps L I,ΣA to LA if and only if for every N ∈ Σ the filter
∂N on ΣN is either trivial or an ultrafilter. 
Analogously to the finite case, Conditions (2) and (3) can be reformulated as stated in
Lemmas 41–43. The remaining verifications are a lengthy but routine transcription of the
proof of Theorem 40, and will be omitted.
Corollary 68. We have C ⊆C′ if and only if D ⊆D ′. More explicitely, C(P)⊆C′(P) for
every profile P ∈P I,ΣA if and only if DN ⊆D ′N for every measurable set N ∈ Σ. 
The classification also holds for arrovian voting systems C : L I,ΣA →PA defined on
linear orderings, cf. Corollary 48. This leads again to Corollary 6, which can be formulated
without explicit reference to the coalition structure D nor any other technical details.
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